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ARE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
PLAYING A BETTER TRIPS GAME?
By Peter K. Yu*
ABSTRACT
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights entered into force more than fifteen years ago. Although
commentators have widely criticized the Agreement for its failure to address
the needs, interests, conditions, and priorities of less developed countries,
few have examined whether these countries have now attained greater
success in shaping the development of the Agreement than they did before.
This Article seeks to fill the void by examining the performance of these
countries at various stages of development of the TRIPS Agreement.
Utilizing game theory and game metaphors, this Article disaggregates the
"TRIPS game" into five different mini-games: (1) negotiation; (2)
implementation; (3) enforcement; (4) interpretation; and (5) compliance. The
Article then analyzes the performance of less developed countries in these
games. By documenting the state of play in each game, this Article
highlights the complex and dynamic nature of TRIPS developments as well
as the machinations of WTO members. The Article underscores the need for
a more holistic perspective in studying the TRIPS Agreement.
* Copyright C 2013 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and Director,
Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Wenlan Scholar Chair Professor,
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law; Visiting Professor, Centre for International
Intellectual Property Studies, University of Strasbourg. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs Symposium on
"International Intellectual Property Law and the 21st Century: Will Developing World Lead or
Follow?". The Author would like to thank Neil Netanel for his kind invitation and the participants
for their valuable comments and suggestions. He is also grateful to Erica Liabo and Lindsey Purdy
for excellent research and editorial assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) entered into force on January 1, 1995. For
more than fifteen years, the TRIPS Agreement has strengthened the
standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
among less developed members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 2
Commentators have widely criticized the TRIPS Agreement for its failure to
address the needs, interests, conditions, and priorities of less developed
countries. 3  Few commentators, however, have examined whether these
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2 The TRIPS Agreement distinguishes between developing and least developed countries.
See, e.g., id. arts. 65-66. This Article uses "less developed countries" to denote both
developing and least developed countries. When referring to the TRIPS Agreement, however,
this Article may return to using the terms "developing countries" and "least developed
countries."
See generally Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827
(2007) (discussing the enclosure of the policy space less developed countries have in
designing intellectual property systems that fit their needs, interests, goals, and priorities).
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countries have now attained greater success in shaping the development of
the TRIPS Agreement than they did before. This Article seeks to fill the
void by examining the performance of less developed countries at various
stages of development of the Agreement.
Following a growing volume of literature applying game theory or game
metaphors to the TRIPS Agreement, 4 this Article disaggregates the "TRIPS
game" into five different mini-games: (1) negotiation; (2) implementation;
(3) enforcement; (4) interpretation; and (5) compliance. The Article then
analyzes the performance of less developed countries in these games. By
documenting the state of play in each game, this Article highlights the
complex and dynamic nature of TRIPS developments as well as the
machinations of WTO members. The Article underscores the need for a
more holistic perspective in studying the TRIPS Agreement.
I. THE NEGOTIATION GAME
A. Phase 1: TRIPS Negotiations
Commentators have examined at length the origins of the TRIPS
Agreement.5  While it is hard to pinpoint these origins, at least four
dominant narratives exist: (1) bargain; (2) coercion; (3) ignorance; and (4)
4 See, e.g., CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009)
(describing the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement as an "implementation game"); Ruth
L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 819, 823 (2003) (introducing "the two-stage game as a model to
evaluate the implications of dispute settlement on sovereign discretion over domestic
intellectual property policy"); Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can
Teach About Intellectual Property and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218
(2003) (considering the process of international harmonization of intellectual property
standards as a game).
Game theory, indeed, has been widely used in the international law context. See, e.g.,
Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory ofInternational Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679
(2003); Moshe Hirsch, Game Theory, International Law and Future Environmental
Cooperation in the Middle East, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75 (1998).
5 See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 3-27 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the origins and development of the TRIPS
Agreement); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11-47 (2001) (recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS
Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,
371-79 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents] (examining four different
accounts of the origins of the TRIPS Agreement).
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self-interest. The most widely used is the bargain narrative, which considers
the TRIPS Agreement the product of a compromise between developed and
less developed countries.6 In this narrative, developed countries received
stronger protection for intellectual property rights and a reduction in
restrictions against foreign direct investment. In return, less developed
countries obtained lower tariffs on textiles and agriculture and protection via
the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process against unilateral sanctions
imposed by the United States and other developed countries.
Compared with this dominant narrative, the other three narratives
downplay, or even question, the existence of a "grand bargain" between
developed and less developed countries. The coercion narrative portrays the
TRIPS Agreement as an unfair trade instrument that developed countries
imposed upon their less developed counterparts.7  The ignorance narrative
emphasizes the inability of less developed countries to understand, during
the TRIPS negotiations, the importance of intellectual property protection-
and, by extension, the impact of the TRIPS Agreement. The self-interest
narrative postulates that less developed countries agreed to stronger
intellectual property protection because they considered such protection in
their self-interest. 9
Although all four narratives provide valuable insights into
understanding the origins of the TRIPS Agreement, they are not mutually
exclusive. They are also incomplete. Being state-centered, all four
narratives fail to fully capture the active participation of non-state actors.10
6 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 5, at 371-73 (discussing the bargain
narrative).
See id. at 373-75 (discussing the coercion narrative).
See id. at 375-76 (discussing the ignorance narrative).
9 See id. at 376-79 (discussing the self-interest narrative).
10 As Susan Sell explained:
State-centric accounts of the Uruguay Round are at best incomplete, and at worst
misleading, as they obscure the driving forces behind the TRIPS Agreement....
In the TRIPS case, private actors pursued their interests through multiple
channels and struck bargains with multiple actors: domestic interindustry
counterparts, domestic governments, foreign governments, foreign private sector
counterparts, domestic and foreign industry associations, and international
organizations. They vigorously pursued their IP [intellectual property]
objectives at all possible levels and in multiple venues, successfully redefining
intellectual property as a trade issue.... It was not merely their relative
economic power that led to their ultimate success, but their command of IP
expertise, their ideas, their information, and their framing skills (translating
complex issues into political discourse).
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Although civil society organizations, b most accounts, did not actively
participate in the TRIPS negotiations, corporations and trade groups
aggressively pushed for the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement.12 As Susan
Sell boldly declared, as far as the Agreement was concerned, "twelve
corporations made public law for the world."l 3
In sum, a wide variety of narratives, both state- and non-state-centered,
exist to account for the origins of the TRIPS Agreement. Regardless of
which narrative one finds most convincing, less developed countries clearly
did not experience much success in the negotiation process. While they
submitted a negotiating text-the so-called B text-for consideration, most
of the TRIPS Agreement's final language came from the A text, which drew
on proposals submitted by developed countries.14 In the end, less developed
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 8 (2003).
" See id. at 181 ("When [Professor Sell] asked some public-regarding copyright activists
'where they had been' during TRIPS, they told [her] they had been 'sleeping' but that because
of TRIPS they had 'woken up."'); Ellen 't Hoen, The Revised Drug Strategy: Access to
Essential Medicines, Intellectual Property, and the World Health Organization, in ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127, 131 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy
Kapczynski eds., 2010) (stating that it was at the International Conference on National
Medicinal Drug Policies in Sydney in 1995 that "for the first time public-health advocates
raised the concern that the globalization of new international trade rules and the
harmonization of regulatory requirements would restrict countries' ability to implement drug
policies that would ensure access to medicine for all.").
12 For detailed discussions of the private sector's active involvement in the development of
the TRIPS Agreement, see generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002); SELL, supra note 10.
3 SELL, supra note 10, at 96.
14 As Daniel Gervais, who was working at the Secretariat at the time of the negotiations,
recounted in detail:
In the first few months of 1990, a number of industrialized countries tabled, with
little advance notice, draft legal texts of what they saw as the future TRIPS
Agreement. Prior to the tabling of these texts, the discussions had focused on
identifying existing norms and possible trade-related gaps therein, but the
emerging outline of a possible TRIPS result had essentially been at the level of
principles, not legal texts. The draft legal texts, which emanated from the
European Community, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and Australia,
foreshadowed a detailed agreement covering all IP rights then in existence, even
the seldom used sui generis protection for computer chips. The proposals also
included detailed provisions on the enforcement of those rights before national
courts and customs authorities and a provision bringing future TRIPS disputes
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")/WTO dispute-
settlement umbrella. These proposals were far from obvious in light of the
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countries only obtained limited concessions in the form of articles 1.1, 7, 8,
40, 41.5, 65, 66, and 67, and some minor adjustments in other provisions.
The second sentence of article 1.1 specifically states that "Members
may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement."1 5 Articles 7 and 8
lay down the Agreement's overarching objectives and normative
principles.16 Article 40 permits member states to take appropriate measures
to curb "an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market." Article 41.5 explicitly stipulates that
a WTO member is not required to devote more resources to intellectual
property enforcement than to other areas of law enforcement.
In addition, articles 65.2 and 65.3 delayed the implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement in less developed and transition countries for four years.19
Article 66.1 granted least developed countries a transitional period of ten
years,20 which has since been extended to at least seventeen and a half
limited mandate of the TRIPS negotiating group.
As a reaction, more than a dozen developing countries proposed another
"legal" text, much more limited in scope, with few specific normative aspects.
They insisted on the need to maintain flexibility to implement economic and
social development objectives. In retrospect, some developing countries may
feel that the Uruguay Round Secretariat did them a disservice by preparing a
"composite" text, which melded all industrialized countries' proposals into what
became the "A" proposal, while the developing countries' text became the "B"
text. The final Agreement mirrored the "A" text. As such, it essentially
embodied norms that had been accepted by industrialized countries. The
concerns of developing countries were reflected in large part in two
provisions-Articles 7 and 8.
Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74
FoRDHAM L. REV. 505, 507-08 (2005).
15 TRIPS Agreement art. 1.
6 Id. arts. 7-8. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS
Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REV. 979 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Objectives and Principles]
(discussing articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement).
17 TRIPS Agreement art. 40.
8 Id. art. 41.5 ("Nothing in [Part III of the Agreement] creates any obligation with respect
to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the
enforcement of law in general.").
19 Id. arts. 65.2-.3.
20 Id. art. 66.1.
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years.21 Article 66.2 states that "[d]eveloped country Members shall provide
incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country
Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological
base." 22 Article 67 requires developed countries to "provide, on request and
on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation
in favour of developing and least-developed country Members."23
In the remaining provisions, which were drawn primarily from
developed countries' proposals, less developed countries obtained
concessions through the built-in ambiguities, flexibilities, limitations, and
exceptions. For example, some provisions, like those in Part III of the
TRIPS Agreement, contain vague, broad, undefined, and result-oriented
terms. These terms include "'effective', 'reasonable', 'undue',
'unwarranted', 'fair and equitable', and 'not ... unnecessarily complicated
or costly."'24 Some provisions also introduce empowerment norms, as
opposed to norms mandating specific actions.25 Moreover, key terms have
21 Shortly before the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005, WTO members
extended the transitional period to July 1, 2013 for those least developed countries that have
yet to meet the TRIPS requirements. See Press Release, World Trade Org., Poorest Countries
Given More Time to Apply Intellectual Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005),
https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres05_e/pr4 24_e.htm. The Doha Declaration, which
was adopted four years earlier, extended the deadline for the formal introduction of both
patent protection for pharmaceuticals and protection for undisclosed clinical trial data to
January 1, 2016. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health 7, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
22 TRIPS Agreement art. 66.2.
23 Id. art. 67 ("Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and
regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the
prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or
reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the
training of personnel.").
24 UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 576 (2005); see also
J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the
TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 23, 71 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed.
2008) ("[The TRIPS] enforcement provisions-unlike the substantive standards set out in the
agreement-are truly minimum standards, as attested by the loose and open-ended language
in which they are cast.").
25 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 43-48, 50, 53, 56, 57, 59. As Rachel Brewster lamented:
"Essentially, the TRIPS Agreement relies on the existence of formal sanctions and not the
efforts of governments to enforce domestic laws." Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits
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been left undefined in several articles,26 thereby creating what Jayashree
Watal and other commentators have described as "constructive
ambiguities." 27
While all of these concessions have benefited less developed countries,
they do not offset the many new and higher substantive and enforcement
standards developed countries successfully imposed upon their less
developed counterparts.28 Even worse, if the TRIPS Agreement is viewed as
a bargain between developed and less developed countries, as advanced
through the bargain narrative, the latter group of countries not only got a bad
bargain but also a failed one.
The TRIPS bargain is bad because gains by less developed countries in
the areas of agriculture and textiles would not make up for losses in the
to Developing Countries of Linking International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (2011); see also id. at 31 ("[T]he TRIPS Agreement's enforcement provisions
are institution-oriented, not outcome-oriented."). Consider, for example, article 59, the
provision at issue in China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights. That provision states that "competent authorities shall have the
authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods" seized at the border.
TRIPS Agreement art. 59 (emphasis added). The concerned authorities, however, need not
order the destruction or disposal of the seized goods. See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS
Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REv. 1046, 1069-75 (2011) (discussing the United States'
claim in the WTO dispute that the Chinese customs authorities had failed to properly dispose
of infringing goods seized at the border pursuant to article 46-and, by extension, article
59-of the TRIPS Agreement).
26 For example, the term "commercial scale" in article 61 was undefined. See Panel
Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights % 7.532-.579, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Panel Report] (providing the
interpretation of the phrase "on a commercial scale"). The lack of such a crucial definition
eventually posed a fatal challenge to the United States' complaint against China over its
failure to extend criminal sanctions to "wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on
a commercial scale." See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 25, at 1056-69
(discussing the United States' claim in the WTO dispute that the high thresholds for criminal
procedures and penalties in the intellectual property area in China are inconsistent with article
61 of the TRIPS Agreement). Because the United States was unable to advance sufficient
evidence to "demonstrate what constituted 'a commercial scale' in the specific situation of
China's marketplace," the WTO panel found that the United States had failed to substantiate
its claim. Panel Report, supra, 1 7.615-.616.
27 See WATAL, supra note 5, at 7 (advancing the concept of "constructive ambiguities");
Yu, Objectives and Principles, supra note 16, at 1022-23 (discussing the ambiguities within
the TRIPS Agreement).
28 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41-61 (mandating new and higher standards for enforcement
of intellectual property rights); see also Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 5, at 373-
75 (discussing the coercion narrative).
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intellectual property and information technology areas.29 Many less
developed countries simply do not possess the needed wealth, infrastructure,
and technological base to take advantage of the opportunities created by the
TRIPS-based intellectual property system. 30  They also do not have the
economic strengths or established legal mechanisms to overcome problems
created by such a system.31
The TRIPS bargain also failed because developed countries thus far
have refused to honor their promises to reduce tariffs and subsidies in the
areas of agriculture and textiles.32 These concessions were what initially
enticed less developed countries to strengthen intellectual property
protection and increase market access through the WTO negotiations. To
date, cotton subsidies has remained one of the most contentious issues in the
present Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations (Doha Round).33
B. Phase 2: TRIPS Recalibrations34
Notwithstanding the limited success of less developed countries in
shaping the TRIPS Agreement during the initial phase of the negotiation
process, these countries have been using the Doha Round to regain some of
the ground they lost during the TRIPS negotiations. For example, during the
Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, countries voted to accept the
29 See id. at 379 ("[E]mpirical records have indicated that less developed countries not only
got a bad bargain, as some would say, but also a failed bargain.").
30 See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 237
(2000) (noting that "[1]ong-run gains would come at the expense of costlier access in the
medium term").
31 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 5, at 382-83.
32 See COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 8 (2002) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT] (noting
that many less developed countries "feel that the commitments made by developed countries
to liberalise agriculture and textiles and reduce tariffs, have not been honoured, while they
have to live with the burdens of the TRIPS agreement"); SELL, supra note 10, at 173 (stating
that "there is . .. no evidence that developed countries are making good on their commitments
to open their markets more widely to developing countries' agricultural and textile exports").
3 See Ravi Kanth Devarakonda, "Cotton Dossier" Will Make or Break WTO's Doha
Round, INTER PRESS SERV. (June 9, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51762.
34 One could arguably add a sixth revision game to the five mini-games examined in this
Article. However, the analysis of that game is quite similar to that of a negotiation game.
This Part therefore groups the discussion of the TRIPS revision game together with the
TRIPS negotiation game.
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proposal to formally amend the TRIPS Agreement. 35 Built upon paragraph
6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health36 (Doha
Declaration), the proposed amendment will add article 31bis to the TRIPS
Agreement. If adopted, the provision will allow countries with insufficient
or no manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of patented
pharmaceuticals. Although the amendment has not entered into effect due to
insufficient ratifications by WTO members, 37 the temporary arrangement
called for by the Doha Declaration will remain in effect until the adoption of
a permanent arrangement.38
In recent years, less developed countries have also advanced a proposal
for the development of a new article 29bis,39 which seeks to create an
obligation to disclose the source of origin of the biological resources and
traditional knowledge in patent applications.40 The proposal further requires
patent applicants to disclose their compliance with access and benefit-
sharing requirements under the relevant national laws.41 Thus far, a large
3 See General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005),
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/wtl641_e.htm.
36 Doha Declaration, supra note 21, 16.
3 As of this writing, more than a third of the 158 WTO member states, including the
United States, India, Japan, China, and the European Union, have ratified the proposed
amendment. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips -e/amendment e.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2012).
38 See Doha Declaration, supra note 21, 6.
3 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, The Relationship
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity: Checklist of
Issues, IP/C/W/420 (Mar. 2, 2004) (providing a checklist of issues that should be explored by
the Council, including the disclosure of the source of origin of the biological resources and
traditional knowledge used in patent-seeking inventions); Council for Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Elements of the Obligation to Disclose the Source and Country of
Origin of the Biological Resources and/or Traditional Knowledge Used in an Invention,
IP/C/W/429/Rev.1 (Sept. 27, 2004) (discussing issues listed in a checklist and proposing that
the TRIPS Agreement be amended to include a mandatory disclosure requirement); Emanuela
Arezzo, Struggling Around the "Natural" Divide: The Protection of Tangible and Intangible
Indigenous Property, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 382-85 (2007) (discussing
proposals to add a disclosure requirement in the TRIPS Agreement).
40 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Trade Negotiations
Comm., Doha Work Programme-The Outstanding Implementation Issue on the Relationship
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity 2,
WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006) (requiring patent applicants to "disclose the country
providing the resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing
country they were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin").
41 See id. (requiring patent applications to "provide information including evidence of
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number of less developed countries have supported this proposal.42 The
United States and Japan, by contrast, strongly oppose it, expressing their fear
that the additional requirement would destabilize the existing patent
43system.
In addition, less developed countries seem to have achieved some
success in linking the disclosure issue in the TRIPS Agreement to the
Convention on Biological Diversity.44 For example, the Doha Ministerial
Declaration "instruct[ed] the Council for TRIPS . . . to examine . . . the
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity [and] the protection of traditional knowledge and
folklore." 45 Such discussion is particularly important in light of the recent
adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity.46 Adopted in October 2010, this
protocol aims to promote the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
from the utilization of genetic resources, thereby contributing to the
conservation and the sustainable use of biological diversity.47
In sum, although the TRIPS negotiations were completed more than a
decade and a half ago, the TRIPS negotiation game has not yet ended. With
continued negotiations during the Doha Round and the arrival of new issues
compliance with the applicable legal requirements in the providing country for prior informed
consent for access and fair and equitable benefit-sharing arising from the commercial or other
utilization of such resources and/or associated traditional knowledge").
42 See William New, WTO Biodiversity Amendment Backed; EU Seeks 'New Thinking' on
GIs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/10/26/wto-
biodiversity-amendment-backed-eu-seeks-new-thinking-on-gis/ (describing the support of the
majority of the WTO membership).
43 See Arezzo, supra note 39, at 387-88 (noting that the United States' opposition is based
on its concern that the disclosure requirement would "render[] the application mechanism
excessively burdensome and the validity of its protection uncertain").
4 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993). The Convention was established in 1992 to promote
"the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources." Id.
art. 1.
45 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 19,
WT/MIN(0 1)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
46 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Oct. 29,
2010, available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf.
47 Id. art. 1.
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and overlapping areas, this game has never been more exciting. Because
less developed countries have acquired greater leverage and better
negotiation skills in recent years, the game they play today has also become
more sophisticated. If these countries continue to improve, the outcome of
the second phase of this negotiation game is likely to be rather different from
that of the first phase.
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME
The high costs of implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the low
payoffs to less developed countries have placed a significant burden on
many of these countries. As Michael Finger, a World Bank economist,
observed, the introduction and enforcement of laws alone has created in less
developed countries an obligation of $60 billion per year.48 Depending on
how the laws are implemented and whether additional infrastructural support
is needed, this obligation can become even more costly, thereby threatening
to take away more scarce resources from competing public needs.49
If the TRIPS obligations are not costly enough, the TRIPS Agreement's
one-sidedness has increased the implementation challenges confronting less
developed countries. As the World Bank estimated, "rent transfers to major
technology-creating countries-particularly the United States, Germany, and
France-in the form of pharmaceutical patents, computer chip designs, and
other intellectual property, would amount to more than $20 billion" if the
TRIPS Agreement were fully implemented. Likewise, Jagdish Bhagwati
declared, "TRIPS does not involve mutual gain; rather, it positions the WTO
primarily as a collector of intellectual property-related rents on behalf of
multinational corporations. . . ."
48 J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 4 (J. Michael Finger &
Philip Schuler eds., 2004) (citing J. Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A
View from the Uruguay Round 9 (Asia Development Bank, ERD Working Paper Series No.
21, 2002), available at http://www.adb.org/documents/ERD/WorkingPapers/wp02 I.pdf).
49 For discussions of the development of low-cost intellectual property systems, see IPR
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 32, at 145-46; ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 181-85 (1990); Sean A. Pager, Patents on a
Shoestring: Making Patent Protection Work for Developing Countries, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
755 (2007).
so See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2002, xvii (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2002/Resources/
gep2002complete.pdf.
51 Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing Countries into a New Round of
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Notwithstanding these potential adverse impacts, many less developed
countries have quickly embraced the TRIPS Agreement. In her recent book,
Carolyn Deere Birkbeck showed shockingly that some of the poorest
countries in francophone Africa have adopted some of the highest
protections in the intellectual property area.52 Such adoption is particularly
troubling considering that the United States and other developed countries
have not exerted pressure on these countries to strengthen intellectual
property protection. As the author reminded us, "[n]o African [least
developed country] has ever been cited on the US Special 301 list or subject
to a WTO dispute." 53
Compared with these countries, large developing countries have played
the implementation game much better. India, for example, took full
advantage of the transitional period for developing countries. Indeed, the
country has used the transitional period so aggressively that it became the
subject of two WTO complaints shortly after the TRIPS Agreement entered
into force. In India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, the United States and later the European Communities
successfully challenged, through parallel proceedings, India's failure to
establish a mailbox system 55 in its patent law pursuant to article 70.8 of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFS. & INT'L TRADE, TRADE POLICY
RESEARCH 2001, 19, 21 (2001).
52 See DEERE, supra note 4, at 232 ("[I]n francophone Africa, . . . a group of the world's
poorest countries adopted some of the world's highest IP standards at an earlier date than
TRIPS required."). See generally id. at 240-86 (discussing the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement in francophone Africa).
1 Id. at 306.
54 Compared with India, China was unable to take advantage of this transitional period, as
it did not join the WTO until December 2001, close to two years after the expiration of the
period. See Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2 (2003) (remarks of the Author) (stating that China became the 143rd
member of the international trading body on December 11, 2001).
5 Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Where a Member does not make available as of the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products commensurate with its obligations under Article 27, that
Member shall:
(a) notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI, provide as from the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement a means by which
applications for patents for such inventions can be filed . . ..
TRIPS Agreement art. 70.8(a).
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Notwithstanding its losses in these proceedings, India succeeded in
delaying the introduction of a new patent law for pharmaceutical products
until after the expiration of the transitional period.57 Section 3(d) of that law
specifically prevents patent protection from being granted to
the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does
not result in increased efficacy of that substance or the mere
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or
of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless
such process results in a new product or employs at least one new
reactant.58
Because of this prohibition, multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers
have considered the provision a major concern. 59  As of this writing,
Novartis is still challenging the provision before the Indian Supreme
Court.60
In retrospect, India's success in taking full advantage of the TRIPS
transitional period not only demonstrates how well large developing
countries have played the implementation game, but also underscores the
importance for less developed countries to utilize the flexibilities available in
the TRIPS Agreement.61 By experimenting with different policy options
56 Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998); Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997).
57 For comprehensive discussions of the recent changes in Indian patent law, see generally
Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS
Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1571 (2009); Janice M.
Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System and
the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. Pirr. L. REV. 491 (2007); Srividhya
Ragavan, Of the Inequals ofthe Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273 (2006).
5 The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 3(d), INDIA CODE (2005).
5 See Kapczynski, supra note 57, at 1590-92 (discussing the operation of Section 3(d) of
the Indian patent law and how it limits patent rights).
60 See Katy Daigle, Novartis Fights Patent Rejection in Indian Court, GUARDIAN, Sept. 6,
2011, http:// http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9832383. That lawsuit was
precipitated by the patent office's rejection of Novartis's patent in Gleevec, a drug for treating
chronic myeloid leukemia and other cancers. See id.
61 Indeed, with the recent extensions of the transitional periods for least developed
countries, it has become particularly important for these countries to take full advantage of the
transitional periods. As Sisule Musungu reminded us:
While giving extra time due to administrative and financial constraints was one
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and delaying the introduction of TRIPS standards, India successfully
maintained an intellectual property system that was tailored to its local
needs, interests, conditions, and priorities.
In sum, although the TRIPS implementation game has not garnered as
much scholarly attention as the TRIPS negotiation game,62 the stakes in the
implementation game are high for less developed countries. How well they
play the game ultimately will depend on how well they utilize, and
experiment with, the flexibilities available under the TRIPS Agreement.
India succeeded in this game not only because it is a powerful developing
country but also because it has the ability to determine for itself the
appropriate intellectual property policies as permissible under the WTO
rules.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT GAME
During the TRIPS negotiations, intellectual property enforcement
presented one of the most challenging issues for negotiators.63 While
adequate and effective enforcement is essential to the effective operation of
the intellectual property system, higher enforcement standards often come
64with a hefty price tag, difficult tradeoffs, and significant intrusions on
sovereignty. Indeed, less developed countries were so concerned about the
aim, the central objective of the LDCs [least-developed countries] transition
period under the TRIPS Agreement is different. Article 66.1 of TRIPS read
together with the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement and its objectives under
Article [7] envisage the purpose and objectives of the LDCs transition period to
be to respond and address: the special needs and requirements of these countries;
and the need for maximum flexibility to help these countries create a sound and
viable technological base.
Sisule F. Musungu, A Conceptual Framework for Priority Identification and Delivery of IP
Technical Assistance for LDCs During the Extended Transition Period Under the TRIPS
Agreement 5 (Quaker United Nations Office, Issue Paper No. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/lssues/Priority-ID-English.pdf (endnote omitted).
62 The rare exception is DEERE, supra note 4.
63 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 492-99
(2011) (discussing the enforcement-related negotiation challenges).
6 See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 2-6 (2010)
(discussing the costs of strong intellectual property enforcement norms and the resulting
trade-offs).
65 See Panel Report, supra note 26, 1 7.501 (acknowledging the "sensitive nature of
criminal matters and attendant concerns regarding sovereignty"); Frederick M. Abbott,
Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from the Global
Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health 6-7 (International Centre for Trade and
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heightened obligations that they specifically negotiated for article 41.5 of the
TRIPS Agreement to preempt demands for resources to set up specialized
intellectual Rroperty courts or to strengthen intellectual property
enforcement.
As a result of the compromises struck by WTO members in the
enforcement area, the TRIPS Agreement has had very limited success in
inducing less developed countries to offer stronger global enforcement of
intellectual property rights. As I explained in a recent article, historical,
economic, tactical, disciplinary, and technolo ical challenges have, and
continue to, militate against such enforcement. It is therefore no surprise
that Jerome Reichman and David Lange have described articles 41 to 61 as
the "Achilles' heel of the TRIPS Agreement." 68
From the standpoint of developed countries, the TRIPS standards are
primitive, constrained, inadequate, and ineffective.69 To strengthen these
Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, 2009), available at http://ictsd.org/
downloads/2009/07/
innovation-and-technology-transfer-to-address-climate-change.pdf ("National governments
traditionally are unwilling to surrender sovereignty over the specific implementation of IPRs,
just as they are unwilling to surrender sovereignty over their budgets or their military
institutions.").
66 See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 417 (2007); UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 24, at
585.
67 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 63, at 483-504 (discussing five sets of
challenges that hamper the TRIPS Agreement's ability to provide effective global
enforcement of intellectual property rights).
68 See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case
for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 34-39 (1998) (explaining why the enforcement
provisions are the "Achilles' heel of the TRIPS Agreement"); see also Yu, TRIPS and Its
Achilles'Heel, supra note 63 (using "Achilles' Heel" in the title of the article).
69 See, e.g., European Comm'n, Directorate Gen. for Trade, Strategy for the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries 1, 3 (2005), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc-I 22636.pdf ("Violations of
intellectual property rights ... continue to increase, having reached, in recent years, industrial
proportions. This happens despite the fact that, by now, most of the WTO members have
adopted legislation implementing minimum standards of IPR enforcement."); TIMOTHY P.
TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS
BORDERS 4 (2008) (noting that "[1]t has become apparent to some national governments and
regional organizations that the 'aggressive' enforcement provisions of TRIPS, particularly the
border measures, have fallen short of expectations of providing an effective system of
thwarting international movement of infringing goods."); Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual
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standards, developed countries and their supportive industries have recently
pushed for the establishment of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), a highly controversial plurilateral agreement that seeks to set a new
and higher benchmark for intellectual property enforcement among like-
minded countries. 71 Developed countries have also actively engaged in the
creation of TRIPS-plus enforcement standards through other bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional trade and investment agreements. 72
From the standpoint of less developed countries, however, the TRIPS
enforcement provisions are neither inadequate nor ineffective. Instead, the
limited enforcement of intellectual property rights on the ground in less
developed countries can be seen as a blessing in disguise. By facilitating
Property Enforcement: A Reality Gap (Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 47 (2008-2009) (discussing the inadequacies of the
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and explaining the need for TRIPS-plus
bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the border enforcement area).
70 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf. Most recently, the
agreement was signed by more than two-thirds of the negotiating parties-namely, Australia,
Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States. Press
Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement Negotiating Parties (Oct. 1, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/201 I/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag.
71 See generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 2-9 (2011)
(criticizing the use of the "country club" approach to establish ACTA); Peter K. Yu, Six
Secret (and Now Open) Fears ofACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011) (discussing the serious
concerns about ACTA).
72 See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher Heath &
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free trade agreements
in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting
Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade
Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259 (2008)
(criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Jean-Fr6d6ric Morin, Multilateralizing
TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175
(2009) (examining the United States' free trade agreement strategy); Pedro Roffe et al.,
Intellectual Property Rights in Free Trade Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum
Standards, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER
WTO RULES 266 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (discussing free trade agreements in relation to
the TRIPS framework); Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International
Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) [hereinafter Yu,
Currents and Crosscurrents] (discussing the growing use of bilateral, plurilateral, and
regional trade agreements to push for new and higher intellectual property standards); Peter
K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 961-86 (2011) (critically
examining the strengths and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements).
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what commentators have described as the "benign neglect" of intellectual
property rights, 73 the ineffective TRIPS provisions have provided the much-
needed balance against the highly aggressive standards pushed by developed
countries. They have also benefited those countries that continue to struge
to adjust their intellectual property systems to the higher TRIPS standards.
Nevertheless, the continued insistence on having minimum TRIPS
enforcement standards may not always be beneficial. For some fast-growing
developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, such insistence could
become problematic when local creators and innovators begin to emerge. At
some point, under-enforcement will pose a major barrier to the countries'
economic development efforts. 75
Greater enforcement could also become more attractive to less
developed countries when the international intellectual property system
better protects their interests, such as traditional knowledge and cultural
expressions. Their need to reverse position is easy to understand. Without
adequate enforcement, provisions that offer stronger protection to the
developing countries' interests are unlikely to deliver the intended results. 76
Because less developed countries are now able to derive more benefits from
7 See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field
of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L.
77, 100 (2005); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2004).
74 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 63, at 504.
7 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined
Future, I WIPO J. 1, 10-15 (2009) (discussing the existence of a crossover point where
countries consider in their self-interest to move from a pirating nation to one that strongly
respects intellectual property rights).
76As I noted earlier:
A country's interest in setting new and higher international intellectual property
enforcement norms depends largely on the overall structure of the global
intellectual property system and the substantive benefits that country can derive
from reforming the system. As less developed countries continue to push for
greater protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions-and to
some extent, geographical indications-they eventually will reach a point where
the existing system will provide them with some attractive benefits. At that
point, they may begin to value the effective enforcement of intellectual property
rights as highly as their developed counterparts.
Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 63, at 523-24; see also Peter K. Yu, Cultural
Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 433, 453 (2008)
(discussing how "enforcement issues may provide a promising opportunity for both
developed and less-developed countries to cooperate").
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the system, they are also more eager to join developed countries in
establishing higher international intellectual property enforcement standards.
In sum, although developed and less developed countries remain far
apart in terms of both the actual level of enforcement and the level they
consider optimal, the needs, interests, and conditions of less developed
countries have been slowly changing. As these countries obtain a bigger
stake in the international intellectual property regime, they will provide
better and stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. At that time,
they will also play the TRIPS enforcement game rather differently.
IV. THE INTERPRETATION GAME
Under the WTO, the TRIPS Agreement can be interpreted through two
different processes. The first process involves the Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council), which is charged
with monitoring the operation of the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO
members' compliance with its obligations. 77 The second process involves
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is established to address
disputes arising between and among member states. This Part discusses
these two processes in turn.
A. TRIPS Council Meetings
Thus far, less developed countries have not been very active in the
TRIPS Council. For example, when developed countries-such as the
United States, the members of the European Union, Japan, and
Switzerland-advanced proposals to strengthen enforcement standards
during the Council meetings, less developed countries merely uttered their
strong opposition to the introduction of these standards. 79  As the latter
group of countries insisted, enforcement issues should be handled by the
DSB, not the TRIPS Council.80 These countries further expressed concern
n See TRIPS Agreement art. 68 ("The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of
this Agreement and, in particular, Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, and
shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights.").
7 See id art. 64; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
7 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 63, at 506-07.
80 See William New, TRIPS Council Issues Still Alive for WTO Ministerial, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (Oct. 28, 2005, 8:10 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/10/28/trips-council-
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that the discussion of enforcement issues would result in unconstructive
"finger pointing" among WTO members that would have distracted the
Council from its work. 8 1 Their opposition, though passive, eventually led to
the rejection of the developed countries' proposals.
In recent TRIPS Council meetings, however, less developed countries
have become more aggressive. In the June 2010 meeting, for instance, both
China and India made important interventions, largely in response to the
release of the draft ACTA text and to the highly disturbing trend concerning
TRIPS-plus enforcement standards. 82
In the first intervention, China explained that the TRIPS-plus
enforcement standards could cause a wide variety of systemic problems
within the international trading system.83 For example, they could raise
potential legal conflicts with the TRIPS Agreement and other WTO
agreements. By increasing the complexity of intellectual property
standards, the TRIPS-plus enforcement standards could also make the
international legal framework highly unpredictable, thereby posing barriers
to legitimate trade.8 5
In addition, the TRIPS-plus standards may upset the delicate balance
struck in the TRIPS Agreement through an arduous multiyear negotiation
86process. The standards could also build harmful technological barriers
while raising concerns about resource misallocation,87 an issue raised
previously in China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights. To conclude its intervention, China advanced
issues-still-alive-for-wto-ministerial/.
81 See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, WTO TRIPS Council Stumbles Over Inclusion of
Enforcement, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2006, 12:23 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2006/10/27/wto-trips-council-stumbles-over-inclusion-of-enforcement/
("In the meeting, several developing countries protested to the presentation and what they
perceived as a way to bring enforcement and 'finger-pointing' into the council . . . .").
82 See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of
Meeting 250, 264, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010) [hereinafter TRIPS Council Minutes].
83 See id. TT 248-63. China's June 9 statement was reprinted as The Problems with the
"TRIPS Plus" Enforcement Trend: China's View, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 13.
84 See TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 82, J 252-53.
81 See id. T 254.
86 See id. 255.
8 See id. 1 256-58.
88 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 727, 778-81 (2011) (discussing China's arguments in relation to Article 41.5 of the
TRIPS Agreement).
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a proposal outlining three specific principles to provide safeguards against
the ongoing push for TRIPS-plus enforcement standards.89 These principles
include:
(i) the [intellectual property] chapter or provisions of [a regional
trade agreement, free trade agreement] or regional agreement to
which a WTO Member was party shall not be inconsistent with the
TRIPS Agreement of WTO; (ii) the enforcement of [intellectual
property rights] shall not create distortive effects on legitimate
international trade; and (iii) no WTO Member shall be restrained
90from the autonomy for utilizing its public enforcement resources.
Following China's intervention, India drew attention to the systemic
problems created by TRIPS-plus standards.91 Of primary concern was the
developed countries' push for ACTA and other TRIPS-plus standards, which
India claimed would upset the balance in the TRIPS Agreement.92 As India
reminded the Council, the second sentence of article 1.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement states specifically that "Members may, but shall not be obliged
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions
of this Agreement." 93 This particular sentence therefore delineates one of
the maximum standards, or the so-called "ceilings," in the TRIPS
Agreement. 94  Viewed from that perspective, the TRIPS Agreement
prohibits WTO members from implementing more extensive protection than
required if such additional protection would contravene the Agreement.95
India further claimed that the introduction of TRIPS-plus standards
"could short-change legal processes, impede legitimate competition and shift
89 See TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 82, 1259.
90 Id.
91 See id. TT 264-73; see also TRIPS Council, Communication from India, Intervention on
TRIPS Plus Enforcement Trends (June 9, 2010), reprinted in Why "IPR Enforcement" in
ACTA & FTAs Harm the South, 49 S. BULL. 1, 10 (2010) [hereinafter India's TRIPS Council
Intervention] (providing a transcript of the speech for India's intervention).
92 See India's TRIPS Council Intervention, supra note 91, at 10.
93 TRIPS Agreement art. 1.
94 India's TRIPS Council Intervention, supra note 91, at 10-11; see also TRIPS Council
Minutes, supra note 82, 265, 272.
95 See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to
International Trade?: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
644, 653-57 (2011) (discussing how this provision can serve as a ceiling requiring WTO
members not to implement more extensive protection than required by the TRIPS Agreement
if such additional protection would contravene the Agreement).
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the escalated costs of enforcing private commercial right to governments,
consumers and tax payers."96 In its view, the standards represent "a
systemic threat to the rights of legitimate traders and producers of goods and
fundamental rights of due process for individuals."9  These standards may
also upset resource allocation while having strong trade-distorting effects. 98
Finally, India lamented the fact that "[intellectual property rights]
negotiations in [regional trade agreements] and plurilateral processes like
ACTA completely bypassed the existing multilateral processes."99 By
undermining the "systemic checks" against trade protectionism that had been
built into the WTO framework, these negotiations have harmed multilateral
trade. 00 The negotiations will also implicate non-signatory members of the
WTO when the negotiated standards are cross-referenced in other
nonmultilateral agreements. '0' Toward the end of the intervention, India
offered a trenchant critique of ACTA, covering issues that ranged from
customs seizure of in-transit generic drugs to the restriction of TRIPS
flexibilities to the inconsistencies between ACTA and the Doha
.102
Declaration.
Compared with the earlier passive resistance put up by less developed
countries in the TRIPS Council, China and India's recent interventions
signaled a more proactive attitude toward the TRIPS interpretation game.
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether less developed countries will take
greater advantage of Council meetings from now on. After all, less
developed countries seemed to have become less vocal since the June 2010
meeting. 103
96 TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 82, T 265.
97 idi.
98 See id. 266.
99 Id. T267.
100 Id.
10 Seeid. 1 268.
102 See id. TT 269-71.
103 Nevertheless, less developed countries continued to register their concerns about the
impact of ACTA negotiations in the next TRIPS Council meeting in October 2010. As
Indonesia noted, "[tihe ACTA initiative has failed to keep in line the TRIPS standards and
thus undermined the safeguards provided by the TRIPS Agreement." Kaitlin Mara, TRIPS
Council Discusses Efficacy ofACTA, Public Health Amendment, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct.
29, 2010, 7:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/10/29/trips-council-discusses-
efficacy-of-acta-public-health-amendment/. Likewise, Brazil criticized ACTA for
"propos[ing] only one remedy against counterfeiting and piracy, and that remedy is
repression." Id. While the country recognized the need for enforcement, it noted that
332 16I1TCLA L_ INT'lL.I_& FOR. AFF77.311 (2011)
Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?
B. WTO Dispute Settlement Process
Similar to their behavior in the TRIPS Council, less developed countries
were initially rather passive in the WTO dispute settlement process.104 Most
of the time, these countries participated in the process defensively. As
mentioned earlier, India was the first developing country against which
developed countries filed a complaint with the DSB, thanks to the WTO
body's aggressive interpretation of the transitional period provisions.10 5
Since then, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and Pakistan have all appeared on
the respondent side of TRIPS-related complaints in the WTO. 106
In April 2007, the United States filed a complaint against China for
failing to protect and enforce intellectual property rights pursuant to the
TRIPS Agreement. 107  Although only a respondent in this dispute, China
defended its position admirably before the DSB. Its defense was joined by
Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey, all of which
participated in the panel proceedings as third parties. 0 s Perhaps because of
enforcement alone "is not enough to combat a problem that results from the interplay of
factors that are to be found in different economic and social realities." Id.
104 See Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, supra note 63, at 515-16.
105 Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998); See Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997).
06 These complaints, in chronological order, were: Request for Consultations by the
United States, Pakistan-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS36/1 (May 6, 1996); Request for Consultations by the United States,
Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS59/1 (Oct. 15,
1996); Request for Consultations by the United States, Argentina-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS 171/1 (May
10, 1999); Request for Consultations by the United States, Argentina-Certain Measures on
the Protection of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS196/1 (June 6, 2000); Request for
Consultations by the United States, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection,
WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000).
107 Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement ofIntellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007).
108 Panel Report, supra note 26, j 1.6. Except for India and Turkey, all of these countries
either provided a written submission to or made an oral statement before the WTO panel. For
discussions of third party participation in the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally
Chad P. Bown, MFN and the Third-Party Economic Interests of Developing Countries in
GA TT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 265
(Joel P. Trachtman & Chantal Thomas eds., 2009); Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, With a
Little Help from Our Friends? Developing Country Complaints and Third-Party
Participation, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM, supra, at 247.
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their more active participation and increased concerted effort, less developed
countries achieved greater success in this dispute than they did. In the end,
although the WTO panel found that China had failed to comply with the
TRIPS Agreement, China, with the support of other less developed
countries, succeeded in defending against half of the claims brought by the
United States.109
More importantly, China and its fellow less developed countries were
able to score some important points that are likely to influence the future
interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. For example,
the panel report underscores both the importance of having minimum
standards and flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and the longstanding
treatment of intellectual property rights as private rights. 110 It also rejects
the use of bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade agreements to divine
meaning in the TRIPS language. In addition, the report demonstrates an
appreciation of the divergent local market conditions in each WTO member
while continuing the use of an evidence-based approach for resolving WTO
disputes.112 The panel's discussion of article 41.5 also hints at its
willingness to consider evidence in cases where resource demands in the
area of intellectual property enforcement have exceeded those in other areas
of law enforcement. Compared with India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, the first dispute
involving a less developed country that resulted in the release of a WTO
panel report,ll4 the US-China dispute demonstrates the significant progress
China and the less developed world have made in using the WTO dispute
settlement process to enhance their performance in the TRIPS interpretation
game.
A year after the release of the panel report in China-Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
109 See Panel Report, supra note 26, 8.1.
110 See Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, supra note 88, at 747-54
(discussing the panel's emphasis on the importance of the TRIPS minimum standards and on
the Agreement's recognition that "intellectual property rights are private rights").
.. See id. at 754-57 (discussing the panel's refusal to treat subsequently-negotiated US
free trade agreements as subsequent agreements within the meaning of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties).
11 See id. at 757-63 (discussing the panel's appreciation of local conditions and its
demands for substantive, as opposed to anecdotal, evidence).
113 See id. at 778-81 (discussing the panel's interpretation of article 41.5 of the TRIPS
Agreement).
114 See text accompanying infra notes 122-23.
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India and Brazil filed complaints against the European Union and the
Netherlands over the repeated seizure of in-transit generic drugs.' 15 These
complaints represent the first attempt by less developed countries to
challenge TRIPS-plus standards-enforcement or otherwise. They also
mark the second time less developed countries have proactively used the
WTO dispute settlement process to address TRIPS concerns.116
In July 2011, India and the European Union reached an interim
settlement. 17 As of this writing, it remains unclear whether India will
withdraw its complaint from the WTO, or whether Brazil will follow suit.
Nevertheless, regardless of how the dispute is eventually resolved, the
European Union's willingness to resolve India's complaint by amending its
customs border regulationsils suggests the growing ability of less developed
countries to take advantage of the WTO dispute settlement process. In this
case, India successfully negotiated with the European Union over border
control measures in the shadow of a WTO complaint. 119
1s Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State-Seizure of
Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); Request for Consultations by Brazil,
European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1
(May 19, 2010). See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in
Transit Based on Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade,
Development and Public Welfare, I W.I.P.O.J. 43 (2009) (discussing issues concerning the
seizure of in-transit generic drugs in Europe).
116 The first time occurred when Brazil filed a retaliatory complaint challenging the US
patent law for violations of articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. Request for
Consultations by Brazil, United States-US Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001). The
complaint was filed in response to the United States' complaint in Request for Consultations
by the United States, Brazil Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DSl99/1 (June 8,
2000).
"' See India, EU Ink Deal to End Drug Seizure for Now, TIMES INDIA (July 29, 2011, 1:21
AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-29/india-business/
29828750_1.generic-drugs-consignments-of-generic-medicines-eu-parliament (reporting the
European Union's interim settlement with India).
11 Council Regulation 1383/2003, Concerning Customs Action Against Goods Suspected
of Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7.
'9 See Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who
Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 459, 476-77 (2004) (noting the importance of negotiation "in the shadow of'
the WTO dispute settlement process); see also Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a
Level Playing Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING
TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 219, 220 (John S. Odell ed., 2006)
(arguing that "the use of legal adjudication allows developing countries to gain better
outcomes in negotiations with their powerful trade partners than they could in a bilateral
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In sum, although the TRIPS interpretation game is complex and highly
technical, and the game's intensive demands for resources and expertise
seem to have stacked up against less developed countries, these countries
have greatly improved their game in recent years. Whether the game is
played in the TRIPS Council or the DSB, less developed countries now
perform much better to promote their interests. It remains to be seen
whether these countries could make further advances in the game to reshape
the development of the Agreement, but that potential certainly exists.
V. THE COMPLIANCE GAME
While reports from the DSB-including those from WTO panels and
the Appellate Body-contain findings regarding WTO members'
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, an additional compliance game
kicks into gear after the release of these reports. Thus far, less developed
countries have behaved responsibly in the WTO, complying with all of the
DSB's findings. When India lost in India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, it introduced a
"mailbox" system collecting patent applications that had been filed since the
inception of the TRIPS Agreement.120 India also provided exclusive
marketing rights pursuant to article 70.9.121
Likewise, when China lost part of its case in China-Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, it
quickly amended both article 4 of its Copyright Law and article 27 of its
Customs Regulations.122 Article 4 of the amended Copyright Law now
negotiation outside of the institution"); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 72, at
392-96 (noting the importance for less developed countries to take advantage of the WTO
dispute settlement process).
120 See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999, No. 17 of 1999, INDIA CODE (1999).
121 Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in
accordance with paragraph 8(a), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted,
notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI, for a period of five years after
obtaining marketing approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted
or rejected in that Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that,
subsequent to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application
has been filed and a patent granted for that product in another Member and
marketing approval obtained in such other Member.
TRIPS Agreement art. 70.9.
122 See Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 25, at 1091-92, 1097-98
(discussing the amendments).
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offers protection to works that have been prohibited for publication or
dissemination.123 Article 27 of the amended Customs Regulations further
prohibits seized counterfeit imports from "enter[ing] the commercial
channels only by eliminating the trademarks on the goods, except for special
circumstances." 24 Both amendments have brought Chinese laws into
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.
The reactions of India and China stood in sharp contrast to those of the
United States. Despite losing in the WTO dispute settlement process, the
United States has repeatedly failed to amend its intellectual property laws to
comply with the panel's findings.125 As Edward Lee recently observed, if a
WTO scorecard is to be created to keep track of WTO members' responses
to their violations, the results for the United States would be rather
disappointing.126 Out of all the TRIPS cases that have resulted in a WTO
panel report, all noncompliance cases occurred when the United States lost
the case.
In United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, the panel
found the business exemption in the Copyright Act to be inconsistent with
the Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.127 The
contested exemption enables some restaurants and small establishments to
play copyrighted music without compensating copyright holders. 128
Notwithstanding the adverse panel report, the United States has refused to
update its statute to ensure compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. The
United States also has refused to make annual payments to the European
123 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (
[Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010).
124 Guowuyuan Guanyu Xiugai (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhishichanquan Haiguan
Baohu Tiaoli) De Jueding (MARpitK HIti
( A l lf M) ) [Decision of the State Council on
Amending the Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Customs Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 24, 2010, effective Apr.
1,2010).
125 See text accompanying infra notes 129-34.
126 See Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance
Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 429 (2011) ("In January 2011, the U.S. scored the
worst of all WTO countries on the TRIPS Compliance Scorecard using either formula
[proposed in the article].").
127 See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 6.266,
WT/DS l60/R (June 15, 2000).
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012).
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Union, even though the arbitration award was determined to be C1,219,900
per year.129 The only payment it has made thus far was $3.3 million, which
was provided more than a year after the arbitration proceeding.130
In United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, a
WTO panel found another US statute inconsistent with the TRIPS
Agreement.131 That statute prohibits the registration or renewal of
trademarks previously abandoned by trademark holders whose business and
assets have been confiscated under Cuban law.132 Following the panel and
Appellate Body reports, the United States has again refused to amend its
noncomplying statute.
While benefits-such as the promotion of goodwill and the fostering of
rule of law in the international trading system-undoubtedly inure to less
developed countries when they comply with WTO panel reports, it is
worthwhile to question whether these countries have managed to play the
TRIPS compliance game to their full advantage. After all, following the
rules of a game is not the same as excelling in a game.
Consider the different approaches the United States and less developed
countries have taken when playing the compliance game. In United States-
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, the United States played the game
by introducing a new "exemptions plus compensation" approach.133 Instead
of amending the noncomplying section of its Copyright Act, the United
States entered into an agreement with the European Communities to submit
to binding arbitration. Although commentators have heavily criticized
this approach,135 there is no denying that the United States has played the
129 See Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, United States-Section
110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 5.1, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
Arbitration Report].
130 Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in
Post- WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 940 n.196 (2006).
131 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002); Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001).
132 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-88(1998).
133 Richard Owens, TRIPS and the Fairness in Music Arbitration: The Repercussions, 25
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 49, 52 (2003).
134 See Arbitration Report, supra note 129.
13s See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International)
Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 585, 629 (2001) ("[Tlhe opportunity for
strategic gaming predicated on the requirement for agreement between disputing states poses
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compliance game tactfully by introducing a new WTO-compliant approach
to protect its interests.
By contrast, less developed countries have not experimented with new
approaches when playing the compliance game. Strict compliance was,
indeed, the standard response. Nevertheless, outside the TRIPS arena, these
countries have been instrumental in shaping the rules involving cross-
retaliations,136 which will have a significant impact on the TRIPS
compliance game.
For example, in United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Brazil
considered the suspension of intellectual property rights as a cross-
retaliatory measure.137  After prevailing in United States-Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
a threat to the notion of equality that a rule-based system was intended to secure."); Owens,
supra note 133, at 52 (lamenting that the United States' approach "raises worrying concerns
that future WTO dispute settlement proceedings might undercut the minimum standards for
intellectual property protection included in the TRIPs Agreement").
136 See Frederick M. Abbott, Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS: Options for Developing
Countries (ICTSD Programme on Dispute Settlement, Issue Paper No. 8, 2009), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/06/cross-retaliation-in-trips.pdf. These rules ironically were
proposed by the United States during the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. As
Professor Brewster recalled:
[T]he demand that WTO retaliation include such cross-agreement retaliation
came from the US government. The US government was concerned about the
enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement. If cross-agreement retaliation was not
permitted, then the US government would be permitted to retaliate for violations
of the TRIPS Agreement only through that Agreement-specifically, the
suspension of the violating state's intellectual property rights. The US
government was concerned that developing countries would not have sufficient
intellectual property (or that the intellectual property lobby would not have
sufficient political power) to make the sanctions effective. Thus, by linking
intellectual property and the trade in goods (the trade in which developing
countries are most politically sensitive), the developed states would have a more
effective weapon against violations of the TRIPS Agreement. The Indian
government resisted this linkage-arguing for retaliation to be limited to each
agreement (that is, GATT to GATT and TRIPS to TRIPS). The result was a
compromise that allows cross-agreement retaliation when other forms of
retaliation are not "practicable or effective" and the conditions are "serious
enough."
Brewster, supra note 25, at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
137 Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8,
2004).
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Antigua and Barbuda also considered similar cross-retaliatory measures.138
Although the DSB has laid down conditions for introducing cross-
retaliations,139 such retaliations may allow less developed countries to
successfully roll back some of what they have lost in the negotiation game.
Indeed, as Rachel Brewster recently pointed out, "intellectual property
retaliation is far more advantageous to developing states, compared to
retaliation in goods, when targeting developed states." 140 As she explained,
such retaliation has three attractive characteristics:
First, it improves net welfare for the developing state-it does not
require that the state bear an economic loss to sanction the violating
state, as do most suspensions of trade in goods or services. Second,
the net welfare gains of retaliation and the greater capacity to
sanction make the threat of sanctions more credible. The more
credible the sanction, the more likely the respondent state is to
modify its behavior, even if sanctions are never actually applied.
Finally, the effects of retaliation in intellectual property are felt by
very influential interest groups in the respondent state. The real
value of trade retaliation is in convincing the target government to
change its policies, and thus, the key element of the sanction's
effectiveness is the political pain it can inflict on the respondent
government, not the net pain that the retaliation causes on the
141respondent state's economy.
Thus, according to Professor Brewster, "retaliation in intellectual property is
likely to give developing states a greater bang for their buck than other
forms of retaliation.' By engaging in an area where the goods subject to
retaliation can be vastly reproduced, intellectual property retaliation has also
greatly expanded the ability of less developed countries to retaliate. 143
138 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
139 See Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, % 156-65, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000); see also Joost Pauwelyn, The
Dog that Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, I J.
INT'L Disp. SETrLEMENT 389, 428-31 (2010) (discussing the constraints on cross-retaliations
undertaken by WTO member states).
140 Brewster, supra note 25, at 7.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 44. As Professor Brewster explained:
The ability to retaliate is no longer based on the size of the sanctioning state's
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In fact, additional examples can be found outside the WTO, where
cross-retaliations have been used to enhance the bargaining positions of less
developed countries. In 1996, for example, China responded to the United
States' threat of intellectual-property-related trade sanctions by sining a
$1.5 billion order for thirty short-haul Airbus planes from France. As I
explained earlier:
From the standpoint of international trade, the move by the Chinese
leaders was ingenious. While the U.S. intellectual property
industries claimed that trade sanctions were needed to protect them
from a potential loss of $2 billion of intellectual property-based
goods and services, Boeing registered an immediate loss of $1.5
billion worth of contracts to its European archrival, Airbus. In the
end, the response by the Chinese leaders skillfully transformed the
issue from a bilateral intellectual property dispute to a domestic
cross-industry trade dispute concerning the United States' overall
interests. As executives from the powerful Boeing Company would
ask following the Airbus deal, "The importance of protecting
intellectual property rights is undeniable, but why should we suffer
to help reduce the loss by the entertainment industries?"14 5
Thus, if less developed countries continue to explore the use of cross-
retaliations in the intellectual property arena, they may be able to greatly
improve their performance in the TRIPS compliance game.
In sum, although less developed countries did not play the compliance
game as creatively as their developed counterparts, they hold an important
weapon in the form of cross-retaliations. If less developed countries
import market, but instead on its ability to reproduce intellectual property. For
instance, the same state that has only $50 million of imports from its target
nation can impose $100 million in sanctions by reproducing $100 million worth
of software, music, or other intellectual property from that state. . . . Some
developing states, such as India and Brazil, have the capacity to reproduce
pharmaceuticals or software, while other developing states may not. But the
technology constraint is relatively low for the reproduction of other types of
intellectual property, such as music or films recorded onto CDs or DVDs.
Almost all nations will have the technology necessary to copy CDs or DVDs and
retaliate by (legally) reproducing these goods.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
' Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 168 (2000).
145 Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 31-32 (footnote omitted).
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skillfully deploy this weapon, and bring the leverage in non-intellectual-
property area to bear on the development of the TRIPS Agreement, they
likely will be able to better maximize their leverage and effectiveness in this
game.
CONCLUSION
As Shakespeare would write in the TRIPS context, "All the TRIPS
Agreement's a complex game, and all the countries merely players." 46 This
Article discusses the performance of less developed countries in five
different mini-games: (1) negotiation; (2) implementation; (3) enforcement;
(4) interpretation; and (5) compliance. Although these countries began with
a lackluster performance in highly challenging negotiation game in the late
1980s and the early 1990s, they have recently attained much greater success
in the enforcement, interpretation, compliance games. Some powerful
developing countries, such as China and India, have also improved their
performance in the implementation game and the second phase of the
negotiation game.
As less developed countries continue to improve, it is important to
explore not only how well they perform in each game but also how each
game would affect the outcome of other games. When we analyze the
TRIPS Agreement, we tend to look at the different distinct aspects of the
Agreement-the negotiation process, implementation reforms, WTO panel
reports, threats of cross-retaliations, you name it. However, all of these
aspects are interconnected. In analyzing five different games in one fell
swoop, this Article shows the wide variety of interactions between
developed and less developed countries surrounding the development of the
TRIPS Agreement. It also demonstrates how a country's performance in one
game can easily affect its performance in other games.
In view of the importance of the TRIPS Agreement and the
multidirectional interactions between these different games, it is essential
that we explore the Agreement more holistically by taking into account its
various stages of development. In so doing, we will gain better and deeper
insights into the full impact of the TRIPS Agreement. We will also be able
to come up with more effective reforms to enable less developed countries to
perform better in the WTO and within the international intellectual property
regime.
46 Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT, act 2, sc. 7 ("All the world's a stage, And
all the men and women merely players.").
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The TRIPS game is not a one-off event where countries will play only
once. It is a reiterated game that countries will have to continue to play over
and over again. From the negotiation and implementation of new rules to
ultimately enforcing those rules to facilitate compliance with TRIPS
standards to the negotiation of even newer rules, the TRIPS game will
include a cycle of mini-games that are connected to each other. How well a
country is to perform in the international intellectual property arena will
depend on how well they have learned to play the TRIPS game.

